Lesson 28: How Does the First Amendment Affect the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion?
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Reynolds v. United States (1879)
Facts of the case:
George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the Utah territorial supreme court.
Case Question:
Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural marriage is part of religious practice?
Case Conclusion:
No. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing for a unanimous court, held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Those who practice polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as part of their religious belief.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/98us145
Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905)
Facts of the case:
A Massachusetts law allowed cities to require residents to be vaccinated against smallpox. Cambridge adopted such an ordinance, with some exceptions. Jacobson refused to comply with the requirement and was fined five dollars.
Case Question:
Did the mandatory vaccination law violate Jacobson's Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty?
Case Conclusion:
No. The Court held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens. Local boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations were needed, thus making the requirement neither unreasonable nor arbitrarily imposed.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/197us11
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)
Facts of the case:
Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses proselytizing in a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by traveling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of the peace.
Case Question:
Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.
Citation:
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296
Minersville v. Gobitis (1940)
Facts of the case:
Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by Biblical commands.
Case Question:
Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Case Conclusion:
No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country." This decision was overturned in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us586
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
Facts of the case:
The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency.
Case Question:
Did the compulsory flag salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson argued that "if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
Citation:
The Oyez Project, West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/319us624
Everson v. Board of Education (1947)
Facts of the case:
A New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. Children who attended Catholic schools also qualified for this transportation subsidy.
Case Question:
Did the New Jersey statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
No. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black argued that services like bussing and police and fire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in any way. It was simply a law enacted as a "general program" to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/330us1
Zorach v. Clauson (1952)
Facts of the case:
In McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court disallowed an Illinois program in which representatives of religious groups came to public schools and taught classes during the school day. In the aftermath of that decision, New York City began a program in which students in public schools could be dismissed from classroom activities for certain periods to participate in religious instruction elsewhere. That program was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals.
Case Question:
Did the New York program violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "released time" program neither constituted the establishment of religion nor interfered with the free exercise of religion. The Court noted that public facilities were not being used for the purpose of religious instruction and that "no student was forced to go to the religious classroom." Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas argued that there was "no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence."
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/343us306
Braunfeld v. Brown (1961)
Facts of the case:
Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.
Case Question:
Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs?
Case Conclusion:
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1960/1960_67
Engel v. Vitale (1962)
Facts of the case:
The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country."
Case Question:
Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1961/1961_468
Sherbert v. Verner (1963)
Facts of the case:
Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied her unemployment benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing Saturday work.
Case Question:
Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_526
Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)
Facts of the case:
The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the school. In a related case--Murray v. Curlett--a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists, challenged the prayer requirement.
Case Question:
Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. The required activities encroached on both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962_142
Welsh v. United States (1970)
Facts of the case:
On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Welsh requested and filed an application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid.
Case Question:
Can Welsh claim conscientious objector status even though he professes no religious-based objection?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." According to Justice Black, the term "religious" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term "places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs." The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."
Citation:
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1969/1969_76
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
Facts of the case:
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Earley v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions."
Case Question:
Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's establishment clause by making state financial aid available to "church-related educational institutions"?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support to religious schools.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1970/1970_89
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)
Facts of the case:
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
Case Question:
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons?
Case Conclusion:
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the state's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_110
Stone v. Graham (1980)
Facts of the case:
Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.
Case Question:
Did the Kentucky statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature," and noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the sabbath.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_80_321
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981)
Facts of the case:
Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a "personal philosophical choice" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.
Case Question:
Does the Free Exercise Clause require a state to provide unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who quit because of a belief that his religion prohibited him from engaging in the employer's line of work?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Burger, the Court held that the Review Board's denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana wrongfully used Thomas' struggle to "articulate" his religious beliefs as grounds to call his decision merely "philosophical." The Court's decisions in Everson v. Board of Education and Sherbert v. Verner had established that "[a] person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program." In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the free exercise clause did not require a "State to provide direct financial assistance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs."
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_952
Bob Jones University v. United States (1983)
Facts of the case:
Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the university's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The university claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting, for the most part, only white students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.
Case Question:
Can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the First Amendment's free exercise clause?
Case Conclusion:
The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."
Citation:
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-3
Mueller v. Allen (1983)
Facts of the case:
A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.
Case Question:
Did the law violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
No. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1982/1982_82_195
Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)
Facts of the case:
The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The nativity scene had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.
Case Question:
Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the nativity scene, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1256
Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)
Facts of the case:
An Alabama law authorized teachers to set aside one minute for voluntary prayer or meditation in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.
Case Question:
Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's establishment clause.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_812
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor (1985)
Facts of the case:
Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton died in 1982 and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case brought on behalf of his estate.
Case Question:
Does the Connecticut statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."
Citation:
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1984/1984_83_1158
Goldman v. Weinberger (1986)
Facts of the case:
Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."
Case Question:
Did the Air Force Regulation violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.
Citation:
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1985/1985_84_1097
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992)
Facts of the case:
New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals but permitted it outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.
Case Question:
Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause?
Case Conclusion:
No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.
Citation:
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1991/1991_91_155
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993)
Facts of the case:
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rites, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
Case Question:
Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_91_948
Lamb
Facts of the case:
A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The district refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The chapel brought suit against the school district in federal court.
Case Question:
Did the district violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel the use of school premises to show religious-oriented films?
Case Conclusion:
Yes, by a unanimous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the district violated freedom of speech by refusing the chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the district's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing--except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the chapel to use the district's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
Link to case: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2024
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995)
Facts of the case:
Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by university guidelines.
Case Question:
Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1994/1994_94_329
Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Facts of the case:
The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a district court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court agreed to hear Boerne's case.
Case Question:
Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.
Citation:
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1996/1996_95_2074
Mitchell v. Helms (2000)
Facts of the case:
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's establishment clause. The district court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the court of appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.
Case Question:
Does Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the state and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."
Citation:
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_98_1648
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000)
Facts of the case:
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The district court barred the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the district court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The court of appeals held that, even as modified by the district court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.
Case Question:
Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_62
Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)
Facts of the case:
Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the club's weekly after-school meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the district court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the court of appeals held that because the club's subject matter was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the club's meetings comprised subject discrimination, which is protected, not viewpoint discrimination, which is not.
Case Question:
Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_99_2036
Van Orden v. Perry (2005)
Facts of the case:
Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.
Case Question:
Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"
Case Conclusion:
No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."
Citation:
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1500
McCreary County v. ACLU (2005)
Facts of the case:
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.
Case Question:
1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?
Case Conclusion:
Yes. Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."
Citation:
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. ___ (2005)
Link to case: http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1693
Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005)
Facts of the case:
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Case Question:
Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
Case Conclusion:
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.
Citation:
The Oyez Project, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
Link to case: http://oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_9877
